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risk; the preferred remedies are public education about
safe drinking, improved policing, better treatment for
alcohol problems, and self regulation by the alcohol
industry—the policies which evidence suggests are the
least likely to reduce problem drinking.5–7
The UK government has foregone the use of the
most effective policy to reduce hazardous drinking:
using taxation to increase the price of the beverages
containing the highest concentrations of alcohol.5 It
justifies this decision by saying that increased price has
not been shown definitely to reduce harm due to alco-
hol,1 an assertion at odds with the views of the world’s
leading researchers on alcohol.5 8
The government has also rejected any policies that
would reduce the availability of alcohol. Instead, it
embraces the paradoxical idea that allowing drinking
for up to 24 hours a day for seven days a week will
reduce binge drinking and public disorder. It believes
that, somehow, longer trading hours will help to create
a continental drinking culture in Britain. This proposal
has caused understandable consternation among
British judges, police, the Royal College of Physicians,
medical researchers, and alcohol experts.8–10
Experience in Australia suggests that even a govern-
ment bent on deregulation could do better.7 Over the
past two decades Australia has expanded alcohol
availability, liberalised trading hours, and not increased
overall taxation on alcohol. In 1980-2000 in the United
Kingdom per capita alcohol consumption increased by
31%, but in Australia it fell by 24%—as did many of the
indicators of alcohol related harm that increased so
steeply in the United Kingdom.7
Australia has imposed lower taxes on low alcohol
(less than 3.8%) beer than full strength beer. Also, all
states defined drink driving as driving with a blood
alcohol concentration over 0.05% (rather than 0.08%
as in the United Kingdom). Drink driving laws have
also been enforced vigorously by well publicised, large
scale random breath testing in the largest states. The
immediate and sustained reduction in deaths and seri-
ous injuries from road crashes that followed the intro-
duction of random breath testing in the largest
Australian state ensured strong public support for
continuing the policy.11 Low alcohol beer now accounts
for 40% of all beer consumed in Australia.7
The UK government could avoid the worsening
epidemic of public drunkenness by not increasing
alcohol availability, by lowering taxes on beverages with
lower alcohol concentrations, and by reducing the limit
for blood alcohol when driving to 0.05%.
If the UK government remains deaf to the
arguments of its critics, it should honour its promise to
evaluate the effects of its policies. Then it would have
the necessary evidence to drop policies that have failed
and replace them with policies that have a chance of
reducing (rather than merely preventing further rises
in) alcohol related harm.
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Regulating the drugs industry transparently
The UK government has not gone far enough in responding to a critical inquiry
Over the past 10-15 years, drug regulatoryauthorities in the United Kingdom andelsewhere have streamlined and accelerated
the review of new drugs in response to claims by the
pharmaceutical industry that over-regulation was stifling
innovation.1 2 Despite these policies, the number of new
molecular entities—a standard measure of innovation in
the industry—submitted to regulatory authorities in the
European Union or United States or launched on the
worldmarket has fallen overall during the past decade.3–5
Between 1993 and 2004, almost double the
number of drugs were withdrawn from the market in
the United Kingdom each year due to lack of safety
than in the previous two decades.6 The withdrawal of
rofecoxib in 2004, affecting millions of patients,
remains an enormous public health issue, as do public
concerns about the safety of the widely prescribed
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors.7 8
In this context the House of Commons Health
Select Committee began its wide ranging inquiry into
the influence of the pharmaceutical industry, publish-
ing its findings on 5 April 2005.9 Although the
committee acknowledged that the industry makes
excellent contributions to medicine and the UK
economy, the report also highlighted important
concerns about the independence of drug regulation
from the interests of the industry; the need to create
conditions in which the industry will produce more
drugs offering significant therapeutic advance; the
industry’s over-promotion of its products to doctors;
our limited knowledge of drug induced illness; and the
cloak of secrecy around UK regulation during the past
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35 years. On 1 September 2005 the government’s
response to the committee’s report showed serious
reflection on these issues.10 The government has
accepted many of the committee’s recommendations,
but too often its response has not gone far enough.
The committee recommended that the Department
of Trade and Industry should take responsibility for rep-
resenting the interests of the pharmaceutical industry,
enabling the Department of Health to concentrate
solely on the regulation of medicines and the protection
and promotion of health. The government rejected this
recommendation on the grounds that “the interests of
patients and the industry are not exclusive” and that the
industry’s role in producing innovative medicines
beneficial to health should be considered together with
its economic investment in the United Kingdom. In this
political context there is a considerable risk that public
health will not be given sufficient priority whenever the
commercial interests of pharmaceutical companies
diverge from, or conflict with, health needs.
Since 1996 fewer than half of the drug innovations
(new molecular entities) in the United States have
offered real therapeutic advances.9 Many are “me too”
drugs: minor molecular modifications of existing
products. They satisfy the technical definition of innova-
tion and seek a slice of a lucrative market, but contribute
little or no therapeutic advance for patients. The House
of Commons Health Select Committee recommended
that the UK Medicines and Healthcare Products
Regulatory Agency (MHRA) should be more proactive
in stimulating the industry to develop drugs of real
therapeutic value and “therapeutic gain.” Despite recog-
nising that the existence of a large number of “me too”
drugs creates difficulties for prescribers, the government
remains unwilling to direct the development of drugs
towards more meaningful new treatments.
The committee also felt that the deluge of promo-
tional material doctors receive from pharmaceutical
companies is excessive and insufficiently counterbal-
anced by independent information, especially when
the manufacturer seeks to establish a market position
for a newly launched drug and patients are most at risk
because little is known about the product. The govern-
ment, on the other hand, believes that the industry’s
current self regulation of drug promotion is accept-
able. Nevertheless, the MHRAmay extend its vetting of
promotional materials to all new molecular entities
and may impose additional restrictions when new
drugs are first released on to the market.
The government now seems to embrace the idea of
patients reporting their own adverse drug reactions
using the Yellow Card scheme that is already used by
prescribers. However, the government ignored the
committee’s call for the Department of Health and the
MHRA to investigate the extent, cost, and implications
of drug induced illness in our communities and to pave
the way for rational cost-benefit assessment of
medicines.
Issues of secrecy, transparency, and public account-
ability in the drug regulatory system pervaded almost
every aspect of the inquiry. The government agrees that
the regulatory system should be as transparent as possi-
ble. It has promised to provide public access to informa-
tion on licensing applications for individual drugs, to the
data supporting authorisation for marketing, and to
assessments of medicines on which regulatory action is
taken. This is a considerable and welcome shift in think-
ing and policy, but these commitments must also be
implemented in practice.
The committee recommended that the MHRA
should make public the material it receives from drug
companies along with its assessments as soon as they are
complete. This would enable scientists and doctors to
scrutinise and engage with the agency’s decision making
processes and would ensure that drug regulation was
publicly defensible and hence more robust. The govern-
ment, however, insists on reaching regulatory decisions
about applications for new drug licences before allowing
any public access to such information. At least, though,
the government has agreed that the MHRA should be
independently reviewed every four or five years.
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SSRIs and gastrointestinal bleeding
Gastroprotection may be justified in some patients
There are theoretical reasons for believing thatselective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs),widely used to treat depression, might increase
the risk of gastrointestinal bleeding. Gastroprotective
drugs are advocated for high risk patients taking non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, another class of
drug that causes gastrointestinal bleeding. What is the
evidence that this advice should be extended to
patients receiving SSRIs?
Serotonin is released from platelets in response
to vascular injury and promotes vasoconstriction and
a change in the shape of the platelets that leads to
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